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ABSTRACT 
This paper examines how entrepreneurs’ human and social capital influence their 
knowledge of finance alternatives. For this purpose, we use survey data from 125 Belgian 
start-ups. Results demonstrate that entrepreneurs with a business education and 
entrepreneurs with experience in accountancy or finance have a broader knowledge of 
finance alternatives. Having a strong network in the financial community further enhances 
the knowledge of finance alternatives. However, more generic human capital has almost 
no impact on the knowledge of finance alternatives. Overall, this study demonstrates how 
not only supply-side factors, but also demand-side factors may constrain entrepreneurs in 
their search for finance.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Finance is one of the necessary resources required for entrepreneurial ventures to 
form and subsequently develop (Gilbert et al. 2006). Finance decisions are hence key 
decisions made by entrepreneurs, which bear significant implications for the operations, 
risk of failure, performance and future growth potential of ventures (Michaelas et al. 
1999; Cassar 2004). Traditional finance theory resorts to the framework of perfect capital 
markets (Modigliani and Miller 1958). This framework assumes that information is free 
and directly available to all entrepreneurs, which allows entrepreneurs to make 
comprehensive finance decisions with wealth maximization as their ultimate goal 
(Brealey and Myers 2000). Moreover, in this perspective, the supply and demand for 
finance are in equilibrium, which implies that all value-creating projects will find 
sufficient finance. Contrary to this image portrayed in traditional finance theory, 
entrepreneurial ventures are often confronted with finance constraints and are not able to 
raise sufficient outside finance necessary to conduct all their value-creating investment 
projects (Himmelberg and Petersen 1994; Hubbard 1998). As a result, the growth of 
entrepreneurial ventures is often restricted by internal finance (Carpenter and Petersen 
2002). 
Scholars studying finance constraints within entrepreneurial ventures have largely 
stressed supply-side arguments, thereby putting the decision-making process of investors 
in the foreground. Within this perspective, prior research mainly focused on the role of 
information asymmetries and transaction costs in explaining why investors may refrain 
from investing in value-creating entrepreneurial ventures (Berger and Udell 1998). We 
argue that finance constraints may also be driven by demand-side factors, and more 
specifically by the characteristics of entrepreneurs. Research on demand-side arguments, 
which puts the decision-making process of entrepreneurs in the foreground, is more 
limited but growing rapidly.  
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Entrepreneurs are the driving force of important decisions and entrepreneurial 
characteristics may hence play an important role in explaining finance decisions (Cassar 
2004). For example, prior research demonstrates how many entrepreneurs have other 
goals besides value maximization. Entrepreneurs may be unwilling to raise outside equity 
because of fear of losing independence and control over their ventures (Manigart and 
Struyf 1997; Sapienza et al. 2003). Moreover, the limited risk tolerance of entrepreneurs 
may preclude them from raising outside debt finance.  
This article focuses on another entrepreneurial characteristic that may restrain the 
finance alternatives considered by entrepreneurs, namely their knowledge of finance 
alternatives. Traditional finance theories implicitly assume that all entrepreneurs are fully 
aware of the existence of all potential finance alternatives and their respective advantages 
and disadvantages. However, recent studies indicate that entrepreneurs may also face 
finance constraints due to the existence of a knowledge gap. Van Auken (2001) showed 
that entrepreneurs of small technology-based ventures are likely to consider only a 
restricted set of finance alternatives, due to their limited understanding of finance choices. 
The goal of this study is to expand this stream of research by explaining why some 
entrepreneurs have a higher knowledge of finance alternatives than others. More 
specifically, the impact of entrepreneurs’ human and social capital on their knowledge of 
finance alternatives is explored. We propose and show that higher levels of specific 
human and social capital - that is more experience in accountancy or finance, business 
education and knowledgeable networks in the financial community - lead to a broader 
knowledge of finance alternatives. This may at least partially explain why entrepreneurs 
with high levels of human capital have less binding capital constraints when starting new 
businesses (Astebro and Bernhardt 2005).  
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In the following section, the theoretical arguments and hypotheses on the impact 
of human and social capital on an entrepreneur’s knowledge of finance alternatives are 
developed. Next, the empirical strategy used to test the hypotheses is explained; the data 
and variables employed in this study are further described. Thereafter, the empirical 
findings are presented, followed by concluding remarks and avenues for future research. 
 
THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENT 
While entrepreneurs are key decision makers shaping the entrepreneurial strategy 
within their ventures, the literature exploring the relationship between entrepreneurial 
characteristics and finance strategies in entrepreneurial ventures is only emerging. In this 
paper, we explore the role of entrepreneurs’ human and social capital. Prior research 
demonstrates how human capital and finance strategies are linked. First, human capital is 
positively related with the wealth of entrepreneurs. Hence, entrepreneurs with more 
human capital can use more of their personal funds to mitigate their venture’s finance 
constraints (Holtz-Eakin et al. 1994; Lindh and Ohlsson 1996; Xu, 1998). Second, the 
human capital of entrepreneurs serves as a quality signal, which is valuable in an 
environment with high levels of information asymmetry (Hallen 2008). Both effects 
explain why ventures established by entrepreneurs with higher human capital generally 
have less binding capital constraints (Astebro and Bernhardt 2005). 
We argue that the human capital of entrepreneurs may not only be associated with 
their personal wealth and quality signals, but also with their knowledge of finance 
alternatives. Financial theory typically assumes that entrepreneurs are fully aware of all 
finance alternatives and their characteristics. However, not all entrepreneurs have an 
equally broad understanding of the finance options that are available, leading to a 
knowledge gap (Gibson 1992). Hence, entrepreneurs are unaware of particular finance 
alternatives, limiting the set of finance options considered by entrepreneurs (Van Auken 
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2001). This may lead to suboptimal finance decisions and ultimately to finance 
constraints.  
According to human capital theory, the ability to accumulate new knowledge 
provides individuals with superior cognitive abilities, which make them more productive 
and efficient in a range of activities (Becker 1964; Schultz 1980). The ability to 
accumulate new knowledge is positively related to the existing stock of knowledge 
(Cohen and Levinthal 1990), including both knowledge formally acquired through 
education, and knowledge tacitly acquired while accumulating experience in a particular 
domain (Dimov and Shepherd 2005).  
A distinction is further made between generic and specific human capital (Becker 
1975; Colombo and Grilli 2005; Dimov and Shepherd 2005). Generic human capital 
refers to the general knowledge acquired by entrepreneurs through both formal education 
and professional experience. Specific human capital relates to knowledge and capabilities 
that entrepreneurs can directly apply to the task at hand (Colombo and Grilli 2005; Dimov 
and Shepherd 2005).  
We propose that entrepreneurs with higher levels of generic human capital will 
experience a lower knowledge gap of finance alternatives, compared to their peers with 
lower levels of generic human capital. More specifically, we expect a positive association 
between the level of education of entrepreneurs and their knowledge of finance 
alternatives. Highly educated entrepreneurs are expected to have a higher knowledge 
base, enabling them to easily acquire specific knowledge of finance alternatives. 
Furthermore, entrepreneurs with higher levels of prior experience may also have a greater 
knowledge of finance alternatives. Entrepreneurs with prior work experience in the same 
industry of the new firm, for example, may have been confronted with industry-related 
finance practices. This leads to our first hypothesis: 
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H1: Entrepreneurs with higher levels of generic human capital have a greater 
knowledge of finance alternatives than entrepreneurs with lower levels of generic 
human capital.  
 
 
Not all human capital has the same effects, however. An entrepreneur’s specific 
human capital may be more valuable than his or her generic human capital in 
entrepreneurial start-ups (Cohen and Levinthal 1990; Colombo and Grilli 2005). In our 
research context, it is likely that entrepreneurs with a business education have a higher 
relevant knowledge base compared to entrepreneurs with higher non-business education 
or compared to entrepreneurs with less education. The broader knowledge base of 
entrepreneurs with a business education further enables them to more easily acquire other 
relevant knowledge. Further, entrepreneurs with previous work experience in accountancy 
or finance are more likely to have a broader and deeper knowledge of finance alternatives 
compared to entrepreneurs without experience in accountancy or finance. This leads to 
our second hypothesis: 
 
 
H2: Entrepreneurs with higher levels of context specific human capital have a 
greater knowledge of finance alternatives than entrepreneurs with lower levels of 
context specific human capital.  
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Next to human capital, entrepreneurs can also learn about finance alternatives 
through their social capital. The central proposition in social capital theory refers to the 
ability of actors to extract benefits, for example information, from their social structures, 
networks and memberships (Lin et al. 1981; Portes 1998; Granovetter 1985; Adler and 
Kwon 2002; Putnam 2000). A high level of social capital of the entrepreneur in the form 
of relationships between individuals is useful in obtaining information that would 
otherwise be unavailable or costly to locate (Granovetter 1985). Relationships with 
relevant individuals and organizations provide an advantage to entrepreneurs through 
access to private information (Podolny 1994). We claim that knowledgeable relationships 
in the financial community, established before start-up, may also reduce information 
problems experienced by entrepreneurs, as they enable information transfer to 
entrepreneurs about potential finance alternatives and investor characteristics. For 
example, entrepreneurs that have relationships with bankers are able to discuss their 
specific financial needs with them, allowing entrepreneurs to gain a deeper understanding 
of finance alternatives. Relationships hence now reduce information asymmetries on the 
demand side of the market. This leads to our third hypothesis: 
 
 
H3: Entrepreneurs with more ties in the financial community have a greater 
knowledge of finance alternatives than entrepreneurs with less ties in the financial 
community. 
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RESEARCH METHOD 
Data collection strategy 
A random sample of 450 Flemish ventures founded between April 2008 and 
September 2008 was selected from the records of business incorporation as provided by 
the Flemish government. Given the homogeneous sample frame, non measured variance 
in terms of geographical location and age is reduced. Moreover, survivorship and 
recollection biases are limited by sampling ventures close to the period of formation 
(Cassar 2004). 
Between mid November 2008 and mid January 2009, all ventures were telephoned 
in order to identify whether or not they fulfilled the conditions of our research. As the 
focus of the research is on real start-ups, 118 subsidiaries or companies that merely 
changed their legal form were excluded. Further, 44 start-ups were not interested in 
participating to our research. This resulted in a sample of 288 independent start-ups which 
were mailed a questionnaire. Several possibilities to complete and return the questionnaire 
were offered, including e-mail, fax, post, and web-survey. A total of 125 usable 
questionnaires were returned after telephone recalls (response rate of 38 percent). 
Comparing characteristics of early and late respondents (for example, management 
experience, experience in the same industry and level of education) with Mann-Whitney 
tests and T-tests showed no significant differences between the two groups. This indicates 
that the sample does not suffer from nonresponse bias. The majority of respondents (84 
percent) completed the questionnaire using the web-survey.  
The questionnaire was developed based on previous research (Van Auken 2001) 
and was organized in three main sections. It was pretested through face-to-face interviews 
with entrepreneurs and slightly adapted to make it comprehensible for the target 
population.  
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The first section collected information about the venture while the second section 
asked respondents to what degree they are familiar with finance alternatives. The third 
section of the questionnaire asked questions about prior experience, education and ties 
with finance experts of the entrepreneurs.  
 
Variables 
Dependent variables. A list of finance alternatives was composed based on the 
finance sources listed by Van Auken (2001) and government programs specific for the 
Flemish region. The knowledge of the respondent with respect to the different finance 
alternatives was measured on a six-point Likert scale ranging from -3 = unaware of the 
existence of a particular finance alternative to 3 = very extensive knowledge, with 0 
indicating an average knowledge. Hence, negative values represent below average 
knowledge of finance alternatives and positive values represent above average knowledge 
of finance alternatives. 
An exploratory factor analysis allowed identifying groups of finance alternatives 
(see Table 1). The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure is 0.868 and Bartlett’s Test 0.000, 
implying that a factor analysis is meaningful. Only factors with an eigenvalue larger than 
one are included in further analysis. This procedure yields three factors, capturing 69 
percent of the total variance after varimax rotation. The factors are broadly consistent 
with those identified by Van Auken (2001). Factor one captures the knowledge of five 
traditional and commonly used finance alternatives: Loans, Credit lines, Trade credit, 
Leasing and Friends and Family financing (Cronbach Alpha = 0.875). Factor two 
(Advanced finance alternatives for the start-up phase) captures the knowledge of four 
special finance alternatives specifically targeted towards start-ups (Cronbach’s Alpha = 
0.742). Besides Business Angels financing, three specific government measures (IWT-
subsidy, Vinnof and ARKimedes) are included.  
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Factor three captures the knowledge of five advanced finance alternatives 
specifically targeted towards growth oriented ventures: Public and Private equity, Bonds, 
Factoring and Venture capital (Cronbach Alpha = 0.887). Given the high Cronbach 
Alpha’s of the three factors, these factors are used as variables in the multivariate 
analyses. The variables were calculated by adding the values for the items that compose 
the variables and dividing by the number of items. 
 
Insert Table 1 About Here 
Table 2 gives the basic statistics of and correlations between the dependent, independent 
and control variables used in the multivariate analyses.  
Insert Table 2 about here 
The entrepreneurs’ knowledge of all types of finance alternatives is limited to very 
limited: the three aggregated variables have a negative value. The best known financing 
methods are common finance alternatives such as bank loans and credit lines, but 
entrepreneurs feel insecure about their knowledge about these basic finance alternatives. 
The knowledge of the advanced finance alternatives is even worse. In particular, the 
advanced finance alternatives for the start-up phase are the least known by the 
entrepreneurs. It is worrying that most of the entrepreneurs are even unaware of the 
existence of the specific government programs targeted towards start-ups.  
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Independent variables. The key independent variables are correlates of the human 
and social capital of the founding entrepreneur. Specific human capital relates to the 
entrepreneur’s education and experience that is valuable for the situation at hand (Dimov 
and Shepherd 2005), that is knowledge of finance. Following variables proxy for specific 
human capital: business education (dummy variable equal to one if the entrepreneur has a 
degree in business and zero otherwise) and number of years of work experience in 
accountancy or finance. Following variables proxy for generic human capital: higher 
education (dummy variable equal to one if the entrepreneur has a university-level or 
equivalent degree and zero otherwise), number of years of work experience in the same 
industry, number of years of work experience in other industries, management experience 
(dummy variable equal to one if the entrepreneur previously held a management position 
in a company employing more than 100 people and zero otherwise), self-employment 
experience (dummy variable equal to one if the entrepreneur has prior self-employment 
experience and zero otherwise), start-up experience (dummy variable equal to one if the 
entrepreneur has prior start-up experience and zero otherwise). 
Almost 72 percent of the entrepreneurs have a university-level or equivalent 
degree and 37 percent have a degree in the field of business. The average entrepreneur in 
our sample has approximately 9 years of previous work experience in the same industry 
and 6.5 years of previous work experience in other industries. Only 17 percent of the 
entrepreneurs have previous work experience in the field of accountancy or finance. 
Approximately one in five entrepreneurs have prior experience as a manager and about 
one in three entrepreneurs have previous self-employment or start up experience. 
The social capital variable is measured with a six-item five-point Likert scale 
ranging from -2 = strongly disagree to +2 = strongly agree, about network ties between 
the entrepreneur and finance experts, based on the items of Shane and Cable (2002). A 
finance expert is each individual with correct and reliable information about finance 
alternatives.  
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The items are: “Prior to the company’s start-up, I had a professional relationship 
with at least one finance expert”; “Prior to the company’s start-up, at least one finance 
expert was someone with whom I had engaged in informal social activity (for example, 
playing tennis, going to the movies)”; “Prior to the company’s start-up, at least one 
finance expert was a personal friend”; “Someone whom I trust to discuss important 
confidential matters knew at least one finance expert”; “A third party whose judgement I 
trust can bring me in contact with a finance expert”; “Through my network of contacts, I 
could obtain information from a finance expert”.  
An exploratory factor analysis is undertaken in order to identify whether all items 
were measuring the same construct. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure is 0.819 and 
Bartlett’s Test 0.000, implying that a factor analysis is meaningful. Only one factor with 
an eigenvalue larger than one was extracted, capturing 60 percent of the total variance. As 
a result, the six items above are measures for the same construct (Cronbach’s alpha = 
0.863). The social capital variable is calculated by taking the average of the values for the 
six items.  
Control variables. As entrepreneurs with high growth ambitions may have more 
thoroughly prepared the start-up of their venture and hence have acquired a better 
knowledge of finance alternatives, the expected growth rate is included as a control 
variable. This is measured as the target number of employees (in full time equivalents) 5 
years after start-up. The average employment target equals approximately 5 employees 
with a maximum of 90 employees. In order to further control for preparation, a dummy 
variable measures whether or not the entrepreneur performed formal financial planning 
before start-up. Almost all entrepreneurs (93 percent) claim that they performed formal 
financial planning before start-up. In addition, we distinguish between start-ups with and 
without external shareholders, with a dummy variable equal to one if there are external 
shareholders and 0 otherwise. If external shareholders are involved, the knowledge base is 
likely to be broader.  
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Only 12 percent of the start-ups have external shareholders. In order to account for 
the initial size of the company, the natural logarithm of the start-up capital is included. 
Entrepreneurs setting up larger start-ups, may have a higher knowledge of finance 
alternatives. Finally, we control for industry effects. We created two industry dummy 
variables, “Wholesale and retail” and “Professional, scientific and technical activities”. 
Almost 60 percent of the start-ups are active in these two industries. The other industries 
represent each less than 10 percent of the sample. The correlations between the 
independent and control variables are not sufficiently large for multicollinearity to cause 
problems in the multivariate regressions.  
 
RESULTS 
The multivariate relationships between the independent and dependent variables 
are analyzed with Tobit regressions, as the dependent variables are censored (see Table 
3). Panel A reports the model with the knowledge of common finance methods as 
dependent variable, panel B reports the model explaining the knowledge of advanced 
start-up finance methods and panel C reports the model explaining the knowledge of 
advanced growth finance methods.  
The coefficients of the control variables show that entrepreneurs with higher 
growth aspirations have a significantly higher knowledge of all finance alternatives. A 
higher level of start-up capital leads to a significantly higher knowledge of common 
finance techniques (Panel A; p<0.05). Interestingly, entrepreneurs of companies active in 
the industry of “Wholesale and retail” have a significantly lower knowledge of common 
finance techniques (Panel A; p<0.1) and advanced finance methods for the growth phase 
(Panel C; p<0.05). Entrepreneurs of companies active in the industry of “Professional, 
scientific and technical activities” have a significantly higher knowledge of advanced 
finance methods for the start-up phase (Panel B; p<0.1). 
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Specific human capital leads to a significantly higher knowledge of finance 
alternatives, especially of common finance alternatives and of advanced finance 
alternatives for the growth phase. More specifically, both business education and 
experience in accountancy or finance lead to significantly higher knowledge of common 
finance alternatives (Panel A; p<0.05) and advanced finance alternatives for the growth 
phase (Panel C; p<0.001). These results strongly support hypothesis 1.  
The impact of general human capital is weaker. Experience in the same industry 
has a no impact on the knowledge of finance alternatives, but experience in other 
industries has a positive impact on the knowledge of common finance alternatives (Panel 
A; p<0.05). Unexpectedly, entrepreneurs with previous start-up experience have a lower 
knowledge of common finance alternatives (Panel A; p<0.05). Experience as a self-
employed and overall management experience have no impact on an entrepreneur’s 
knowledge of finance alternatives. Support for hypothesis 2 is hence weak. 
Insert Table 3 About Here 
The effect of entrepreneurs’ social capital is significant in several model 
specifications. Specifically, an entrepreneur having network ties with finance experts has 
a greater knowledge of the common finance alternatives (Panel A; p<0.01) and the 
advanced finance alternatives for the growth phase (Panel C; p<0.05). These findings 
provide support for hypothesis 3.  
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
While it is widely acknowledged that financial resource acquisition is a key 
process in the start-up and growth of new businesses, our understanding of this process is 
largely rooted in economic theories emphasizing wealth maximization as an overarching 
goal, rational behavior of all actors and information asymmetries. Theories building on 
the existence of information asymmetries typically assume that (potential) investors are 
informationally constrained, which influences their selection processes. This paper 
highlights a second information asymmetry problem, namely the fact that entrepreneurs 
do not have full information of finance alternatives. This knowledge gap leads 
entrepreneurs to select these finance alternatives they are familiar with, potentially 
leading to suboptimal finance structures. 
The main contribution of this paper lies in the finding that entrepreneurs with 
higher levels of specific human and social capital experience lower knowledge gaps. 
Especially specific human capital, that is a business education or previous experience in 
accountancy or finance, increases an entrepreneur’s knowledge of finance alternatives. 
Generic human capital in the form of higher education or general experience has a more 
modest, but also positive impact. The impact of an entrepreneur’s social capital at start-up 
is positive as well. Overall, we contribute to a further socializing of the finance 
acquisition process in entrepreneurial ventures, by demonstrating the key role of 
entrepreneurial characteristics on finance decisions in start-ups.  
We have shown that entrepreneurs’ knowledge of finance alternatives in general is 
rather limited. Even the knowledge of commonly used finance methods is limited. More 
complex finance options, specifically targeted towards growth-oriented ventures, are even 
less understood. The knowledge of finance methods targeted at start-ups is the least 
understood category.  
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Moreover, the lack of knowledge on specific government measures for start-ups is 
worrying, as these are specifically targeted towards the entrepreneurs represented in the 
sample. These findings are broadly consistent with Van Auken (2001) for U.S. 
entrepreneurs. 
A methodological strength of this study is that all social and human capital 
variables are measured at start-up, hence eliminating survival and recall biases. It would 
be interesting to add a longitudinal dimension to the current research. This would allow 
understanding how the initial knowledge gap influences subsequent finance and growth 
processes. Is the knowledge gap of an entrepreneur at start-up a major hindrance in the 
development of the start-up, or is the entrepreneur able to overcome this liability through 
subsequent learning and experience? These are important avenues for future research. 
The study suggests implications for policy makers and for entrepreneurs. The role 
of business education is highlighted. Strengthening life-long education for entrepreneurs 
on business in general and on financial matters in particular is warranted. Further, when 
new policy initiatives are developed, frequent and clear communication with the target 
group and their advisors is key. This study suggests that well-designed initiatives often 
fail to capture the attention of their target group.  
Entrepreneurs should understand that finance is a key resource for their business; 
failure to understand the finance alternatives and their characteristics may seriously 
hamper the development of their ventures. Most entrepreneurs, however, have a limited 
knowledge of finance options, even if they have a broad business experience. They may 
enhance their understanding of finance through training. Further, they should understand 
that links to financial experts are valuable in reducing the knowledge gap. If they do not 
have ties in to finance experts yet, they should actively seek to establish them. If they 
have links to experts, they should activate them and tap their knowledge. 
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TABLE 1 
Rotated Orthogonal Factor Analysis for Knowledge of Finance Alternatives 
(n=120) 
 
 Factor 
 Finance alternatives  1 2 3 
Common finance alternatives    
Loans 0.902 0.036 0.155 
Credit lines  0.855 0.116 0.151 
Trade credit 0.716 0.149 0.391 
Leasing 0.702 0.105 0.327 
Friends and Family financing 0.663 0.090 0.277 
Advanced finance alternatives for 
the start-up phase    
Vinnof -0.030 0.806 0.165 
IWT-subsidy 0.120 0.792 0.012 
ARKimedes 0.127 0.781 0.176 
Business Angels 0.368 0.529 0.446 
Advanced finance alternatives for 
the growth phase     
Public Stock  0.189 0.078 0.882 
Private stock 0.202 0.111 0.851 
Bonds 0.288 0.154 0.725 
Factoring 0.422 0.198 0.647 
Venture capital 0.424 0.397 0.630 
    
Eigenvalue: 6.511 1.839 1.271 
Percent variance explained  46.505 59.639 68.716 
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TABLE 2 
Statistics and correlations of the dependent, independent and control variables a 
 
 
a Correlation coefficients significant at p < 0.05 are shown in bold 
 
Variables N Min Max Mean Std.Dev. Corr.                           
DEPENDENT VARIABLES  
                  
 
Knowledge of common financing 
alternatives 125 -2.80 02.00 -0.14 01.02              
 
Knowledge of advanced financing 
alternatives for the start-up phase 125 -3.00 02.00 -2.43 00.79              
 
Knowledge of advanced financing 
alternatives for the growth phase  125 -3.00 01.40 -1.34 01.15              
 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES  
     1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
Human Capital 
                  
 
Specific human capital  
                   
1. Business education (dummy) 121 -0.00 01.00 -0.37 00.48              
 
2. Number of years of work experience 
gained by founders in the industry of 
accountancy or finance 
121 -0.00 40.00 -1.36 04.90 -0.279              
Generic Human capital                    
 
3. Higher education (dummy) 121 -0.00 01.00 -0.72 00.45 -0.215 -0.092             
4. Number of years of work experience 
gained by founders in the same industry 121 -0.00 40.00 -8.88 07.81 -0.190 -0.034 -0.024            
5. Number of years of work experience 
gained by founders in other industries 121 -0.00 20.00 -6.46 06.74 -0.113 -0.133 -0.057 -0.276           
6. Founder with a prior management 
position in a 
large or medium company (i.e., number 
of employees greater than 100) (dummy) 
121 -0.00 01.00 -0.21 00.41 -0.072 -0.071 -0.274 -0.336 -0.065          
7. Founder with a previous self-
employment experience (dummy) 121 -0.00 01.00 -0.37 00.48 -0.151 -0.051 -0.052 -0.086 -0.120 -0.182         
8. Founder with previous start up 
experience (dummy) 121 -0.00 01.00 -0.31 00.46 -0.120 -0.134 -0.064 -0.139 -0.173 -0.073 -0.677        
Social Capital                    
9. Relationships in the financial community 120 -1.00 01.00 -0.32 00.46 -0.017 -0.038 -0.010 -0.044 -0.144 -0.124 -0.128 -0.087       
CONTROL VARIABLES                    
10. Targeted number of employees after 5 
years  112 -0.00 90.00 -4.96 12.62 -0.036 -0.033 -0.083 -0.114 -0.145 -0.157 -0.017 -0.036 -0.063      
11. Financial planning (dummy) 124 -0.00 01.00 -0.93 00.26 -0.155 -0.067 -0.102 -0.068 -0.099 -0.068 -0.041 -0.015 -0.070 -0.067    
 
12. External shareholders (dummy) 121 -0.00 01.00 -0.12 10.32 -0.011 -0.010 -0.176 -0.061 -0.071 -0.134 -0.011 -0.072 -0.117 -0.181 -0.094    
13. Ln (Level of start-up capital ) 110 -8.01 17.13 10.68 02.99 -0.214 -0.183 -0.125 -0.031 -0.037 -0.134 -0.002 -0.049 -0.120 -0.104 -0.148 -0.024   
14. Wholesale and retail (dummy) 121 -0.00 01.00 -0.31 00.47 -0.001 -0.013 -0.119 -0.133 -0.141 -0.172 -0.037 -0.027 -0.114 -0.094 -0.190 -0.071 -0.101  
15. Professional, scientific and technical 
activities  (dummy) 121 -0.00 01.00 -0.29 00.45 -0.121 -0.051 -0.254 -0.196 -0.065 -0.315 -0.072 -0.193 -0.176 -0.056 -0.096 -0.053 -0.048 -0.432 
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TABLE 3 
Multivariate Tobit Regression Models (n=103) 
  Common 
Start-up 
Advanced 
Growth 
Advanced 
Constant  -1.943*** -1.879*** -1.655*** 
CONTROL VARIABLES    
Number of Employees -0.014* -0.016† -0.019** 
Financial Planning (dummy) -0.308 -0.026 -0.517 
External shareholders (dummy) -0.330 -0.209 -0.570† 
Start-up Capital -0.067* -0.013 -0.000 
Wholesale and retail (dummy) -0.363† -0.229 -0.507* 
Professional, scientific and technical 
activities (dummy) -0.084 -0.637† -0.056 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES     
Human Capital     
Specific HC    
Business Education (dummy) -0.480* -0.367 -0.866*** 
Experience in Accountancy or Finance -0.070* -0.035 -0.052** 
Generic HC    
Higher Education (dummy) -0.158 -0.340 -0.230 
Experience Same Industry -0.005 -0.005 -0.016 
Experience Other Industry -0.035* -0.000 -0.026† 
Management Experience (dummy) -0.063 -0.080 -0.185 
Experience Self-Employment (dummy) -0.126 -0.562 -0.062 
Experience Start-up (dummy) -0.507* -0.076 -0.172 
Social Capital     
Relationships in Financial Community -0.615** -0.318 -0.538* 
    
Mc Fadden's Pseudo- R² -0.214 -0.112 -0.197 
Prob > chi2 -0.000 -0.013 -0.000 
    
 
†<0.1 
*<0.05; 
**<0.01; 
***<0.001; 
 
 
 
